Social norms, bounded rationality and optimal contracts
- 作者： Basov, Suren, author.
- 其他作者：
- 其他題名：
- Studies in economic theory ;
- 出版： Singapore : Springer Singapore :Imprint: Springer
- 叢書名： Studies in economic theory,volume 30
- 主題： Contracts--Economic aspects. , Economics--Psychological aspects. , Economics--Sociological aspects. , Rational expectations (Economic theory) , Social norms--Economic aspects. , Economics. , Behavioral/Experimental Economics.
- ISBN： 9789811010415 (electronic bk.) 、 9789811010392 (paper)
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FIND@SFXID:
CGU
- 資料類型: 電子書
- 內容註: Chapter 1 Preface -- Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality -- Chapter 2 Introduction -- Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design -- Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design -- Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality -- Chapter 6 Conclusions -- Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design -- Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship -- Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems -- Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment -- Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.
- 摘要註: This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
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讀者標籤：
- 系統號： 005361264 | 機讀編目格式
館藏資訊
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.