Knowledge first? [electronic resource]

• 作者： McGlynn, Aidan.
• 出版： Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan :[distributor] Not Avail
• 版本：1st ed.
• 叢書名： Palgrave innovations in philosophy
• 主題： Knowledge, Theory of , Philosophy , Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge.
• ISBN： 1137026464 (electronic bk.): £60.00 、 9781137026453 、 9781137026460 (electronic bk.): £60.00
• FIND@SFXID: CGU
• 資料類型: 電子書
• 內容註: Series Editors' Preface Preface 1. Introduction: Lessons From Gettier PART I: KNOWLEDGE AS THE 'UNEXPLAINED EXPLAINER' 2. Belief 3. Justification 4. Evidence 5. Assertion 6. Action PART II: KNOWLEDGE AS A MENTAL STATE 7. Luminosity 8. Is Knowledge A Mental State? Notes Bibliography Index. Electronic book text. Epublication based on: 9781137026453.
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• 摘要註: According to a long tradition, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by analyzing it as a species of true belief. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology. Knowledge First? offers the first overview of this approach. Aidan McGlynn has done us all a tremendous favour by writing this survey of knowledge first philosophy. The recent debates about knowledge-first philosophy touch upon some of the most important issues in epistemology and related areas, and I could imagine no better introduction than this. McGlynn has a keen eye for detail and a knack for tying the details together into a larger narrative structure. The discussion is critical, but not dismissive. Proponents of knowledge first philosophy and its critics will learn a great deal from this book. I recommend it without reservation.' - Clayton Littlejohn, King's College London, UK 'McGlynn takes a synoptic view of the knowledge first movement, teasing apart its various strands and offering powerful criticisms of many of them. For anyone with an interest in contemporary epistemology, this is essential and compelling reading.' - Martin Smith, University of Glasgow, UK.
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