Legal certainty and central bank autonomy in Latin American emerging markets [electronic resource]
- 作者： Tapia-Hoffmann, Andrea Lucia.
- 其他作者：
- 其他題名：
- European yearbook of international economic law.
- 出版： Cham : Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Springer
- 叢書名： European yearbook of international economic law. EYIEL monographs,v.15
- 主題： Banks and banking, Central--Law and legislation--Latin America. , Banking law--Latin America. , Legal certainty--Latin America. , Monetary policy--Latin America. , Latin America--Economic conditions. , International Economic Law, Trade Law. , Private International Law, International & Foreign Law, Comparative Law. , Latin American and Caribbean Economics.
- ISBN： 9783030709860 (electronic bk.) 、 9783030709853 (paper)
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FIND@SFXID:
CGU
- 資料類型: 電子書
- 內容註: 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal Certainty -- 3 Legal Certainty and Legal Commitment Mechanisms -- 4 Central Bank Objectives and Autonomy -- 5 Central Bank Statutes and Autonomy -- The Constitutional Court of Colombia versus Central Bank Autonomy -- 7 Economic Emergency and Central Bank Autonomy in Argentina -- 8 Towards Monetary Stability in Latin America.
- 摘要註: This book provides a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks of six Latin American central banks to determine whether there is legal certainty regarding central bank autonomy. Based on this, it ascertains whether the way in which legal institutions are designed - specifically those that rule the autonomy of the central bank - provides reasons to believe that central banks can keep inflation at bay even if governments face fiscal problems or pursue contradictory objectives. The analysis covers three key areas: a constitutional analysis, a detailed study of the central bank statutes and a study of a number of underexplored threats to central bank autonomy. After defining and identifying different types of legal certainty and linking them to the credibility of government promises, the author goes on to examine the grounds that the law provides for confidence that central banks operate independently of political influence. The second part of the book focuses on a granular analysis of the legal design of the central banks' objectives and autonomy. Lastly, the third part features two case studies that represent little-known and unusual institutional threats to legal certainty relating to central bank autonomy, such as the interventions by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in the autonomy of the Colombian central bank, and the interventions of the Argentinean executive and legislative branches in the autonomy of Argentina's central bank through stabilization plans introduced via emergency laws and decrees. In sum, the book suggests that there are serious doubts about the ability of Latin American central banks to maintain price stability over time. Although central banks were granted a degree of autonomy, authorities in Latin American countries are able to affect central bank decisions. Most importantly, a lack of clarity, inconsistencies, or generous exceptions in the law provide ways for authorities to influence central banks even without bending or disregardi
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讀者標籤：
- 系統號： 005535496 | 機讀編目格式
館藏資訊
This book provides a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks of six Latin American central banks to determine whether there is legal certainty regarding central bank autonomy. Based on this, it ascertains whether the way in which legal institutions are designed – specifically those that rule the autonomy of the central bank – provides reasons to believe that central banks can keep inflation at bay even if governments face fiscal problems or pursue contradictory objectives. The analysis covers three key areas: a constitutional analysis, a detailed study of the central bank statutes and a study of a number of underexplored threats to central bank autonomy. After defining and identifying different types of legal certainty and linking them to the credibility of government promises, the author goes on to examine the grounds that the law provides for confidence that central banks operate independently of political influence. The second part of the book focuses on a granular analysis of the legal design of the central banks’ objectives and autonomy. Lastly, the third part features two case studies that represent little-known and unusual institutional threats to legal certainty relating to central bank autonomy, such as the interventions by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in the autonomy of the Colombian central bank, and the interventions of the Argentinean executive and legislative branches in the autonomy of Argentina’s central bank through stabilization plans introduced via emergency laws and decrees.In sum, the book suggests that there are serious doubts about the ability of Latin American central banks to maintain price stability over time. Although central banks were granted a degree of autonomy, authorities in Latin American countries are able to affect central bank decisions. Most importantly, a lack of clarity, inconsistencies, or generous exceptions in the law provide ways for authorities to influence central banks even without bending or disregarding the rules.